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Research has identified a range of responses by foreign firms to institutional voids, but has not 
analyzed how and why particular firms respond the way that they do. We draw on the comparative 
capitalisms literature and adopt a critical realist perspective to develop theory abductively. We 
examine two multinationals from the same industry, but contrasting institutional environments that 
work with local organizations in Bangladesh. We reveal how their ownership and control structures, 
host-country institutions and their firm-specific host-country contexts shape their responses, enabling 
us to put forward propositions that will help to explain firms’ variable responses to the same 
institutional void. By linking home-country institutional mechanisms to strategic responses within a 
specific context and highlighting the importance of firms’ fundamental, institutionally conditioned 










The existing literature has identified a range of firm responses to different types of institutional void 
(Doh, Rodrigues, Saka-Helmhout, & Makhija, 2017; Khanna & Palepu, 2010a), but has not identified 
why foreign firms respond differently to the same institutional void, limiting our understanding of 1) 
firms’ strategic behaviour in emerging markets and 2) how other host-country factors beyond the 
institutional void shape company responses. In order to address these issues, we examine how and 
why home-country institutions and host-country institutions and contextual factors influence key 
strategic decisions. 
 
The term ‘institutional void’ denotes that many of the formal institutions associated with developed 
economies and markets are either ‘missing’ or function poorly (Doh et al., 2017; Khanna & Palepu, 
1997, 2006). Institutional voids are synonymous with emerging economies: as Khanna & Palepu 
(2010a: 6; emphasis in the original) note, ‘Ideally, every economy would provide a range of 
institutions to facilitate the functioning of markets, but developing countries fall short in a number of 
ways. These institutional voids make a market “emerging” and are a prime source of the higher 
transaction costs and operating challenges in these markets.’ Emphasizing how the lack of appropriate 
institution prevents or hinders market-based transactions, this quotation makes clear that the term 
‘institutional void’ stems from a transaction cost perspective (Doh et al., 2017; Khanna & Palepu, 
2006). Such voids can characterize a range of institutional areas, including healthcare systems 
(Boddewyn & Doh, 2011; Doh & Lucea, 2013). 
 
A transaction costs approach informs much, but not all, existing work that examines how firms 
respond to institutional voids (El Ghoul, Guedhami, & Kim, 2017; Henisz & Williamson, 1999; 
Pinkham & Peng, 2017). Reviewing the literature, Doh et al. (2017: 293) note that ‘[…] they 
[institutional voids] have largely been associated with firms’ efforts to avoid or mitigate institutional 
deficiencies and reduce the transaction costs associated with operating in settings subject to those 
institutional shortcomings.’ For instance, work has examined how the increased transaction costs 
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associated with institutional voids can encourage companies to rely on informal contracts and gifts as 
governance mechanisms to form partnerships with local organizations (Rivera-Santos, Rufín, & Kolk, 
2012) and how some foreign firms may substitute for the role of the state in infrastructure building 
(Banerjee, Oetzel, & Ranganathan, 2006).  
 
By drawing on transaction costs economics, much of the existing literature focuses on 1) how specific 
institutional voids prevent or impede market-based transactions between companies and other 
organizations (Jackson & Deeg, 2008; Kingsley & Graham, 2017; Regnér & Edman, 2014) and 2) 
how, consequently, firms, in general rather than specific companies, are likely to respond, depending 
on the nature of the void (Doh et al., 2017; El Ghoul et al., 2017). These two foci have three 
consequences. First, they overlook why and how firms from different home-country institutional 
settings are likely to vary (Jackson & Deeg, 2008). Second, by downplaying the variable nature of 
firms, the extant literature does not examine how that variation conditions their response to the same 
institutional void (Kim & Song, 2017; Miller, Lee, Chang, & Le Breton-Miller, 2009; Tan & Meyer, 
2011). Third, by focusing on specific institutional voids, the extant research tends to downplay other 
host-country institutions and broader contextual factors that are also likely to shape firms’ responses 
(Poulis, Poulis, & Plakoyiannaki, 2013; Redding, 2005).  
 
To address these issues and contribute to the literature, we draw on the comparative capitalisms (CC) 
literature to assess how institutions condition firm variety and firm behaviour, and adopt a critical 
realist perspective to examine how institutions and context interact to shape firms’ actions. The 
comparative capitalisms literature views ‘institutional effects more broadly [than the international 
business literature often does] as influencing actors’ identities, interests, and capacities for action’ 
(Jackson & Deeg, 2008: 550). The comparative capitalisms literature, therefore, highlights the 
importance of taking fundamental firm diversity into account to explain company behavior, largely 
linking firm diversity to home-country institutions (Kristensen & Morgan, 2018; Whitley, 1999; Witt 
& Jackson, 2016). In particular, home-country corporate-governance institutions structure firms’ 
ownership and control characteristics and vary considerably between countries (Aguilera & Jackson, 
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2003), helping to explain variation in the nature, priorities and behavior of companies both at home 
and abroad (Hotho & Saka-Helmhout, 2017; Peng, Wang, & Jiang, 2008; Whitley, 2010). As a result, 
we expect firms from contrasting home-country institutional settings to respond differently to the 
same institutional void. 
 
One aim of critical realism is to identify the causal mechanisms that lead to certain outcomes; how 
any particular mechanism actually does or does not operate will vary depending upon the context 
(Ackroyd & Karlsson, 2014; Fleetwood, 2005). This perspective enables us to analyze how the 
broader context of an institutional void influences how different firms respond and helps us to avoid 
‘disembedded results or conclusions’ (Redding, 2005: 123). Importantly, the strategic context of the 
institutional void is likely to be firm specific (Becker-Ritterspach, Lange, & Becker-Ritterspach, 
2017; Geary & Aguzzoli, 2016), meaning that, for example, the relative size of the market for any 
particular firm will shape its response (Pinkham & Peng, 2017). 
 
To explore foreign firms’ responses to institutional voids, we focus on Bangladesh’s healthcare 
system, which suffers from a shortage of skilled public-sector staff, high direct payments by patients 
for care, and the growth of ‘informal’ healthcare providers (WHO, 2015: xvi). These deficiencies 
represent an institutional void as they result in an inadequately funded network of hospitals and an 
insufficient supply of doctors who can inform patients about their conditions and possible treatments, 
provide care to them, and facilitate the transactions of pharmaceutical products from manufacturers 
through to the individuals who need them (Doh et al., 2017; Khanna & Palepu, 2010a). We conduct 
case-study research on the responses to this void of two MNEs (GSK and Novo-Nordisk) from the 
same industry, but whose home-country institutions and host-country contexts vary (Kristensen & 
Morgan, 2018).  
 
We contribute to the literature as we examine how institutions matter, under which conditions they 
matter and the ways that they matter (Jackson, 2010; Peng, 2003). We do this within the context of 
foreign firms’ responses to institutional voids in emerging markets, a growing strand of the literature 
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where there is a need for more research to develop international business theory in novel directions 
(Doh et al., 2017). By relating home-country institutions and host-country institutions and contexts to 
firms’ strategic responses, we seek to offer new insights into company behavior that has important 
practical and theoretical implications. 
 
The remainder of this paper has six sections. The subsequent one discusses MNEs, institutional voids 
and the institutional conditioning of firms. This is followed by a discussion of our research 
perspective and design and our data sources and research methods. We provide a case overview 
before discussing our findings. The final section concludes. 
 
MNEs, INSTITUTIONAL VOIDS AND THE INSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONING OF FIRMS 
 
MNEs’ Responses to Institutional Voids  
The existing literature has shown how institutional voids can characterize a range of markets, 
including product, capital and labor markets, as well as the predictability of regulations and laws 
(Becker-Ritterspach et al., 2017; El Ghoul et al., 2017; Khanna & Palepu, 2010a; Miller et al., 2009). 
Much of the literature on institutional voids has focused on how domestic companies seek to 
overcome the lack or inadequacy of home-country institutions that promote market-based transactions 
(Khanna & Palepu, 2000; Kim & Song, 2017). The literature on how foreign firms respond to 
‘missing’ or poorly functioning market-promoting institutions is still developing, often emphasizing 
how the absence or inadequacy of particularly important institutions increases transaction costs and, 
therefore, impedes or prevents market-based exchange. For instance, research that analyzes foreign 
firms’ responses to institutional voids has focused on weak contract enforcement (Delios & Henisz, 
2000; Pinkham & Peng, 2017; Stephan, Uhlander, & Stride, 2015; Zhou & Xu, 2012), the lack of 
investment-related information (Henisz, 2000; Kingsley & Graham, 2017), and inadequate capital 




What unites much of the existing literature is a transaction-costs perspective. Consequently, their 
empirical findings or theoretical propositions largely relate to firms, in general. For instance, Doh et 
al. (2017: 294) argue that: ‘an institutional voids lens focuses our attention on those institutions that 
best explain the workings of its markets and influence their ability to function well.’ This is 
beneficial: it highlights the myriad forms of institutional voids, focuses analysis on specific ones (Sun, 
Mellahi, & Thun, 2010; Zhou & Xu, 2012), and enables cross-country comparisons of voids and firm 
responses to them (Doh et al., 2017; Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik, & Peng, 2009).  
 
However, existing research does not, typically, consider the diversity of firms at a fundamental level; 
that is, at a level that goes beyond the firm tout court or some relatively narrow aspects of firm 
diversity. For instance, although some existing research takes the type of foreign firm into 
consideration when explaining their responses to institutional voids, distinguishing between banks, 
portfolio investors and MNEs (Kingsley & Graham, 2017), it does not address potential differences 
between individual firms within each firm type. Similarly, other research has highlighted the 
importance of firm size, capabilities and/or experience to explain their responses to institutional voids 
(Delios & Henisz, 2000; Khanna & Palepu, 2010a; Pinkham & Peng, 2017); however, its emphasis on 
transaction costs leads it to downplay essential variation amongst firms, overlooking how institutions 
structure the nature of firms and their capacity to respond in particular ways (Jackson, 2010; Jackson 
& Deeg, 2008; Whitley, 2010; Witt & Jackson, 2016). 
 
Jackson & Deeg's (2008: 544) observation that, in general, the international business literature is not 
clear ‘about how institutional diversity impacts on the capabilities of firms to pursue different types of 
strategy […]’ applies to the existing literature on foreign firms responses to institutional voids. By not 
examining foreign-firm heterogeneity more comprehensively, the extant research cannot fully explain 
how any particular firm responds to an institutional void. As we argue in more detail in the next 
section, institutions help to create fundamental heterogeneity amongst companies (Jackson & Deeg, 




The emphasis within much of the existing literature on the transaction costs associated with key 
institutional voids also tends to lead to a downplaying of broader contextual factors within the 
emerging market that are strategically relevant to specific foreign firms (Doh et al., 2017: 294; 
Khanna & Palepu, 2010a; Meyer et al., 2009). For instance, potential firm responses to institutional 
voids in emerging markets are ‘exit’ or ‘avoidance’ (Doh et al., 2017; Khanna & Palepu, 2010a; 
Regnér & Edman, 2014); this, however, overlooks the importance of particular markets for specific 
MNEs. In other words, Khanna & Palepu's (2010a: 9) argument that ‘Exercising the option to wait 
[and not enter and operate in an emerging market characterized by institutional voids] is relatively 
easy for multinationals, because they can choose where to compete and have the resources to move to 
different markets’ may, in general, be true; however, depending on the relative importance, for 
example, of that emerging market for an MNE, a ‘wait and see’ approach may not be a plausible 
strategy,. 
 
Similarly, quantitative research that examines how institutional voids and the broader context, such as 
national-level measures of social capital and market size, affect firm behavior overlooks firm 
specificities (Meyer et al., 2009; Stephan et al., 2015). A quantitative and national-level approach 
implicitly assumes that contextual factors are equally important to all firms (Michailova, 2011; Poulis 
et al., 2013; Redding, 2005) and downplays actor heterogeneity within any national economy (Lane & 
Wood, 2009). Whilst such an approach can help to explain how actors, in general, respond to 
institutional voids, it cannot explain either specific firms’ responses to the same institutional void or 
how those responses may vary (Miller et al., 2009; Pinkham & Peng, 2017).  
 
Some existing research has highlighted how the incentives for any firm to invest effort and resources 
into overcoming an institutional void either by internalizing transactions typically carried out in 
markets or seeking to mitigate the institutional void itself will depend upon the importance of that 
market to the company (Pinkham & Peng, 2017). At an abstract level, then, such work shows that the 
specificity of the host-country’s context for the foreign firm will matter. We build on this insight to 




The Variable Nature of Firms 
We focus on the home-country institutional pillar of ownership and control (Aguilera & Jackson, 
2010; Estrin, Meyer, Nielsen, & Nielsen, 2015), as previous research indicates that this institution 
exerts a key influence on firms’ priorities, shaping their strategic behavior and interaction with other 
organizations both at home and abroad (Goergen, O’Sullivan, Wood, & Baric, 2018; Luo, Chung, & 
Sobczak, 2009; Witt & Jackson, 2016). National institutions are often key in shaping the nature of 
firms and their strategic priorities (Hotho, 2014; Judge, Fainshmidt, & Lee Brown III, 2014; Whitley, 
1999: 255). Home-country corporate-governance systems are particularly important and vary between 
countries; consequently, firms from different countries are likely to have varying 1) strategic priorities 
in foreign markets and 2) abilities to respond in particular ways (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Whitley, 
1999).  
 
Many international business contributions view institutions and actors as a dualism, treating 
institutions and actors as two conceptually and ontologically separate entities (Jackson & Deeg, 
2008), enabling researchers to distinguish between actors and institutions to assess patterns of 
behavior across either different institutional settings (Hotho, 2014; Witt & Jackson, 2016) or 
heterogeneous actors in similar institutional settings (Miller et al., 2009). 
 
Drawing on structuration theory (Jackson, 2010), the comparative capitalisms literature, by contrast, 
views institutions and actors as a duality, as two conceptually distinct, but ontologically 
interconnected, mutually constituting entities that shape one another (Morgan, 2016). Consequently, 
institutions, because they vary between countries, lead to diversity amongst firms at a fundamental 
level across national contexts (Jackson, 2010: 65; Whitley, 1999). In particular, by influencing the 
relative power of different stakeholders, institutions shape firms’ priorities and abilities to collaborate 
with other organizations (Jackson & Deeg, 2008; Kristensen & Morgan, 2018; Whitley, 1999). 
Therefore, the nature and resources of ‘firms’ is not uniform, but will vary, in large part, according to 




Building on previous work (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003, 2010; Judge et al., 2014), we argue that home-
country corporate governance systems play a key role in shaping firms and their strategic priorities, 
even when firms internationalize (Goergen et al., 2018; Kristensen & Morgan, 2018: 279; Whitley, 
2010). The existing literature classifies Denmark and the UK into contrasting types of capitalism (Hall 
& Soskice, 2001; Hotho, 2014; Kristensen & Morgan, 2018; Witt & Jackson, 2016). In Hall and 
Soskice’s (2001) terminology, Denmark is a ‘coordinated market economy’; the UK a ‘liberal market 
economy’.  
 
Greater block shareholding and restrictions on takeovers mark corporate-governance systems in 
coordinated market economies, lessening the pressure on senior managers in firms to focus on short-
term financial outcomes (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Hall & Soskice, 2001; Witt & Jackson, 2016). 
As Hall & Soskice (2001: 40; emphasis in the original) note, in coordinated market economies, ‘[…] 
systems of corporate governance that insulate firms against hostile takeovers and reduce their 
sensitivity to current profits encourage long employment tenures and the development of the inter-
firm [relations … ].’ Similarly, Whitley, 1999: 76) has highlighted how economies that resemble 
coordinated market economies can enable firms there to collaborate with their business partners in 
open-ended ways. 
 
In general, dispersed share ownership and strong markets for corporate control characterize corporate-
governance systems in liberal market economies (Hall & Soskice, 2001), resulting in 1) pressures on 
companies to emphasize relatively short-term financial performance in an attempt to increase or at 
least maintain share prices and avoid takeovers and 2) firms that are often reluctant to be dependent 
on other organizations for key inputs (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Whitley, 1999; Witt & Jackson, 
2016). As Hall & Soskice (2001: 31) note: ‘Because the market for corporate governance renders 
firms sensitive to fluctuations in current profitability, it is also more difficult for them to make 
credible commitments to relational contracts [with other organizations] that extend over substantial 
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periods of time.’ Similarly, Whitley (1999: 58) has written ‘[…] since capital-market-based financial 
systems facilitate strong markets in corporate control, and hence radical changes in ownership and 
strategic direction, alliance-based forms of economic coordination are unlikely to be significant where 
such markets dominate.’ 
 
Importantly, within the comparative capitalisms literature, institutions do not ‘determine’ outcomes: 
the ‘presence’ of an institution does not mean that any particular outcome is highly likely to occur 
(Jackson & Deeg, 2008). The reasons for this are twofold. First, institutions must be ‘enacted’, 
meaning that actors must make decisions and act in ways that produce and reproduce institutions 
(Jackson, 2010; Kristensen & Morgan, 2012). In corporate governance, for instance, institutional 
investors, who typically have a short-term perspective (Whitley, 1999; Witt & Jackson, 2016), should, 
in general, prioritize more immediate financial outcomes and undertake activities that convey their 
priorities to senior managers in the firms that they have invested in to reproduce this institution. Of 
course, not all actors or individual institutional investors will behave identically, as they will, for 
instance, have different ideas about what will generate better financial returns, depending on their 
training and perspective (Jackson & Deeg, 2008).  
 
Second, actors do not operate in contexts that they control (Jackson, 2010), meaning that the ability of 
actors to achieve their objectives will depend upon the context within which they are working. At 
times, broader contextual factors are likely to facilitate actors’ ability to make decisions and take 
actions that enable them to meet their objectives; at others, the context will inhibit or prevent their 
capacities for certain actions (Goyer, Clark, & Bhankaraully, 2016; Kristensen, 2016). The 
importance attached to contextualization within the comparative capitalisms literature coheres with a 
critical realist perspective.  
 
Institutions and Context 
Critical realism typically distinguishes conceptually between ‘structure’, ‘entities’ (or what we term 
actors), and ‘mechanisms’ (O’Mahoney & Vincent, 2014). As noted above, structures and actors are 
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mutually constitutive, meaning that institutions shape various actors, whilst, at the same time, entities 
influence institutions (Fleetwood, 2005; Whitley, 2010). Home-country corporate governance 
systems, broadly conceived, are key, shaping the nature of firms and creating the potential for certain 
actions (Jackson & Deeg, 2008; Whitley, 1999). Actors are things that are greater than the sum of 
their parts and can be organizations (Fleetwood, 2005; O’Mahoney & Vincent, 2014: 6); this means, 
for instance, that firms, in their own right, can achieve more than the people or physical objects that 
constitute them can do alone (Elder-Vass, 2010). As a result, actors have potential causal powers, 
possibly being able to achieve particular outcomes.  
 
For an entity to exercise its powers, at least one mechanism is required (O’Mahoney & Vincent, 
2014). Indeed , a key aim of critical realism is to identify the causal mechanisms behind phenomenon 
rather than measure the observable regularities that may accompany them (Kessler & Bach, 2014; 
Sayer, 1992; Welch, Piekkari, Plakoyiannaki, & Paavilainen-Mäntymäki, 2011); how any particular 
mechanism actually does or does not operate will vary depending upon the context (Ackroyd & 
Karlsson, 2014; Fleetwood, 2005; Sayer, 1992).  
 
In our context, this means that, for instance, firms have the potential power to sell particular products 
in Bangladesh; in order to achieve this outcome, firms may (or may not) be able to rely on one or 
more of the following potential causal mechanisms 1) contracts, 2) arm’s length ties to local 
organizations, 3) partnerships with local organizations, and/or 4) internal capabilities. The ability of 
an MNE, for instance, to forge a non-contractual partnership with a local organization is likely to 
depend not just on its institutional constitution, but also on aspects of the host economy, such as the 
relatively size of that market that may either encourage or discourage a partnership approach. 
 
RESEARCH PERSPECTIVE AND DESIGN 
Our research aims to identify the causal mechanisms that explain how and why MNEs’ responses to 
the same institutional void vary (if at all). In order to capture that complexity of both causal 
mechanisms and context, we adopt a comparative case study approach, which matches a critical 
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realist research perspective well (Kessler & Bach, 2014; Welch et al., 2011) and can help to overcome 
some of the difficulties of obtaining measures that have construct validity across different national 
settings (Witt & Redding, 2014). Following Kessler & Bach's (2014: 169) recommendation to select 
case studies using ‘light theorization’, we chose our focal companies because they have contrasting 
characteristics that offer a tentative, but feasible a priori explanation of any differing responses they 
may have to the institutional void (Ackroyd & Karlsson, 2014; Kessler & Bach, 2014). Our two focal 
firms come from the same industry, the pharmaceutical sector, so share an emphasis on research and 
marketing (GSK, 2017; Novo-Nordisk, 2017a). However, we anticipate that the differences between 
the two case study companies’ home-country corporate governance systems will shape how they 
respond to the same institutional void in Bangladesh’s healthcare system (Kristensen & Morgan, 
2018).  
 
For us, the causal mechanism is how the companies try (if at all) to sell their pharmaceutical products 
in Bangladesh with Novo-Nordisk more likely than GSK to be able to collaborate closely with local 
organizations in open-ended ways, as such action is more consistent with the commitment of Danish 
foundations, of which Novo-Nordisk is one, to build institutions for social and economic benefits 
(Kristensen & Morgan, 2018: 280). However, how this causal mechanism interacts with the host-
country context is unknown. It will, therefore, be important for us to assess the relative importance of 
context and the causal mechanism (Ackroyd & Karlsson, 2014: 31). 
 
DATA SOURCES AND COLLECTION 
We rely on a range of sources, including interviewees, company documents (press releases and annual 
reports) and reports from international organizations to analyze our theoretical proposal that home-
country corporate ownership and control institutions will be the key influence on firms’ interactions 
with local organizations in Bangladesh in response to the country’s institutional void in healthcare. To 
assess these interactions, our interviewees included company informants, local organization 
informants, and relevant industry actors and we relied on observation notes from the company and 
project visits and secondary information (Balogun, Fahy, & Vaara, 2017). We selected interviewees 
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for their knowledge of Novo-Nordisk’s and GSK’s activities in Bangladesh. In line with a critical 
realist perspective, we sought to encourage interviewees to provide their views of the institutional 
framework that they operate within (Edwards, Vincent, & O’Mahoney, 2014: 319). We used a range 
of complementary data sources to help us reveal the causal mechanisms at play and their links to 
underlying institutional structures (Kessler & Bach, 2014: 171). Similarly, when conducting the 
interviews and analyzing the documentary evidence, we sought to identify causal mechanisms and 
influential contingencies (Harrison & Easton, 2004: 195). 
 
We conducted our interviews in two phases (2012 and 2017), enabling us to ask follow-up questions 
where necessary and make deep enquiry on the observable codes appeared in the first phase. The 
numbers we report specify both the count of different individuals we spoke to, and the number of 
interviews conducted; the number of interviews and informants differ as we interviewed several 
people multiple times.. Table 1 provides details of our interviewees’ from MNEs and local 
organizations in Bangladesh. Interviews typically lasted between 60 and 90 minutes and, to enhance 
the efficacy of the interviews and to increase the interviewees’ receptiveness to the researcher (Cooke, 
2002), were conducted by one of the paper’s authors in Bengali. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
Bangladesh is a low-trust society and obtaining permission to record interviews is difficult (Welch, 
Marschan-Piekkari, Penttinen, & Tahvanainen, 2002). This was the case regardless of whether we 
contacted interviewees through the MNE directly or through one of the authors’ professional network. 
The first round of interviews took place in 2012 and helped us to develop relationships with the 
companies and local organizations, enabling subsequent interviews and observations in 2017. 
Interview information and quotations were written in a notebook. Following Welch, Marschan-
Piekkari, Penttinen, & Tahvanainen (2002), we sent interviewees drafts of this paper for them to 
verify the accuracy of the material and our interpretation of it. We were able to record several 




We also collected secondary information from company publications, other organizations’ published 
documents, and newspapers, enabling us to triangulate the information from multiple sources to 
corroborate information, ensure reliability, and develop codes. We focus on the MNEs as well as local 
organizations in Bangladesh to obtain a representative and holistic picture of Novo-Nordisk’s and 
GSK’s activities. We adopt a ‘synthetic strategy’ to analyze our process data, viewing the whole 
process, or causal mechanism, as the unit of analysis and  relating the characteristics of the process to 
other variables  (Langley, 1999), which for us are institutions, contexts, and firm responses.  
 
DATA ANALYSIS 
We collected and analyzed our data concurrently (Yin, 2009), taking notes, drawing up codes, and 
developing concepts. Figure 1 depicts our coding process. Pursuing an abductive approach, we 
followed variable-based analysis (Kessler & Bach, 2014); thus our primary and secondary data 
collected in the first phase enabled us to develop first-order codes and concepts in relation to how 
host-firm-specific contexts influence how MNEs respond to the institutional void.  
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
In the second phase, we focused our data collection, enabling us to verify the first-order codes 
developed in the first phase, add new ones from the second phase, develop themes and compare these 
between cases to generalize the themes that answer our research question. Figure 2 sets out our data-
coding structure and analysis. Using qualitative data-coding logic and process (Miles, Huberman, & 
Saldana, 2014), we built in verbatim codes and noted the firms’ responses. As the analysis progressed, 
we clustered similar codes & strategies and differentiated the others by making another cluster, which 
led to the first-order categories. 
  
Following Monaghan & Tippmann (2018), we identified the underlying logic of each first-order 
category, i.e. the rationality of why each construct was a strategic response and why one response 
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worked for one company, but not necessarily (or in different ways) for the other. Next, we built 
second-order themes, using axial coding to understand how our first order categories could be 
clustered into more abstract aggregate concepts. We compared and contrasted the themes emerging 
through coding with theoretical concepts that deal with MNE responses to institutional void. We then 
finally combined the aggregate concepts with literature and developed a holistic framework and 
propositions in relation to research questions. Figure 3 sets out this process. 
 
Figure 3 about here 
 
CASE OVERVIEW 
Before presenting our findings, we briefly describe the two firms and their activities in Bangladesh. 
 
Novo-Nordisk A/S 
Novo-Nordisk, headquartered in Denmark, is a global healthcare company. It employs over 42,000 
people in 79 countries. It focuses on treating diabetes and other serious chronic diseases, mainly 
hemophilia (Novo-Nordisk, 2017a). The sale of drugs to treat diabetes accounts for more than 80 per 
cent of the firm’s total sales (Novo-Nordisk, 2017a: 4). Its operating margin on drugs to treat diabetes 
(roughly 41%) is less than that for biopharmaceuticals for, inter alia, hemophilia (56%) (Novo-
Nordisk, 2017a: 67).  
 
There are two types of share in Novo-Nordisk A/S, A and B (Novo-Nordisk, 2017b). Each A share 
has 200 votes; each B share, 20 votes (Novo-Nordisk, 2017b). The company’s A shares are not listed 
and are owned by Novo A/S company, a holding company that the Novo-Nordisk Foundation  wholly 
owns; the Foundation’s objectives are: ‘to provide a stable basis for commercial and research 
activities conducted by the companies within the Novo Group [of which Novo Nordisk is the largest], 
and to support scientific and humanitarian purposes’ (Novo-Nordisk, 2017, emphasis added). At the 
end of 2015, Novo Holdings A/S owned A and B shares in Novo Nordisk A/S equivalent to 27 per 
cent of the share capital and 74.5 per cent of the votes (Novo Nordisk Foundation, 2016). The 
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Foundation’s Articles of Association prevent it from selling its A shares, limiting the risk of a hostile 
takeover of Novo-Nordisk A/S. The Foundation emphasizes social and environmental targets as well 
as financial performance (Novo Nordisk Foundation, 2017), Novo-Nordisk A/S conforms, in terms of 
its ownership and control structures, to the coordinated market economy ideal type.  
 
In Bangladesh, Novo-Nordisk has a wholly owned subsidiary, Novo-Nordisk Pharma (Private) 
Limited (NNPP) (Novo-Nordisk, 2017a: 94). This subsidiary focuses, as its parent company does 
globally, on the treatment of diabetes. The parent company’s ownership and control structures 
potentially enable NNPP to focus on more open-ended forms of collaboration with other organizations 
(Whitley, 1999) and create the conditions for NNPP to adopt a long-term perspective in its dealings 
with organizations in Bangladesh (Kristensen & Morgan, 2018: 282).  
 
GlaxoSmithKline PLC (GSK) 
GlaxoSmithKline PLC was established in 2000 after the merger of Glaxo Welcome PLC and 
SmithKline Beecham PLC. It manufactures and sells its products on an international basis. Its two 
main product groups, pharmaceuticals and consumer healthcare products, account for 57 per cent and 
26 per cent of the company’s global sales, respectively (GSK, 2017: 3). It has over 99,000 employees. 
 
GSK has a primary listing on the London Stock Exchange and a secondary one on the New York 
Stock Exchange. It is owned and controlled by a dispersed group of shareholders with few, if any, 
investors owning five per cent or more of the company’s shares. GlaxoSmithKline PLC (GSK) 
conforms in terms of its ownership and control structure to the liberal market economy ideal type; 
consequently, the company is likely to prioritize relatively short-term financial objectives over more 
open-ended goals (Whitley, 1999).  
 
GlaxoSmithKline Finance PLC through its wholly owned subsidiary, Setfirst Limited, has 
approximately 82 per cent of the shares in GlaxoSmithKline Bangladesh Limited (GSKB), which has 
been operating, in different legal forms, in the country for over 60 years. The Investment Corporation 
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of Bangladesh (ICB), owned by the Bangladeshi state, owns just over 13 per cent of the shares in 
GSKB. Institutional investors and retail investors own the remaining 5 per cent of shares (GSKB, 
2017). GSK is, therefore, the main influence over GSKB. 
 
FINDINGS 
Home-Country Institutions and Product Selection  
The firms’ home-country financial and corporate governance systems influence which products firms 
focus on selling abroad. As NNPP is private firm, there are no published accounts relating specifically 
to its sales in Bangladesh. NNPP documentation, however, clearly shows that the company focuses on 
selling pharmaceutical products to treat diabetes in Bangladesh and works with local organizations to 
do so, emphasizing ‘sustainable partnerships’ to enhance the treatment of diabetes in the country and 
increase its market share (Novo-Nordisk, 2012). It does not emphasize other medical treatments that 
the company delivers that have a higher operating margin.  
 
GSKB pursues, as GSK does, a product-market strategy that encompasses the ‘manufacturing and 
marketing of pharmaceuticals, vaccines and consumer healthcare products’ (GSKB, 2017: 78). In 
2015 and 2016, GSKB earned more than twice as much from the sale of consumer healthcare products 
than it did from the sale of pharmaceutical products in Bangladesh (GSKB, 2017: 93). By contrast, 
GSK as a whole earns twice as much from pharmaceuticals as it does from healthcare (GSKB, 2017: 
59). Moreover, in Bangladesh, the proportion of the gross profit accounted for by pharmaceutical 
products fell from approximately 20 per cent to 10 per cent between 2015 and 2016; conversely, the 
proportion of the gross profit coming from the sale of consumer healthcare products increased from 
around 80 per cent to 90 per cent between 2015 and 2016 (GSKB, 2017: 93). These data suggest that 
GSKB focuses more on the sale of consumer healthcare products than it does on pharmaceutical 
products, in part, reflecting institutional influences to prioritize financial returns (see also GSKB, 




Indeed, the General Secretary of the Bangladesh Medical Association noted that ‘GSKB produces the 
best quality medicines, but now they got involved with foods and drinks, and lost their focus in the 
medical industry’ (Med17). Home-country institutions, therefore, influence product-market strategies, 
as do host-country institutions, as GSK sells a limited number of medicines in Bangladesh, as we 
discuss in the next section. 
 
Host-Country Institutions and Firm Responses 
Research on institutions in some Asian countries, including Bangladesh, is limited (Pezeshkan, Smith, 
Fainshmidt, & Amini Sedeh, 2016; Witt & Redding, 2014). There are important host-country 
institutions that affect how both companies respond to the institutional void in Bangladesh’s 
healthcare system. The 1982 Drugs Control Ordinance (later incorporated into Bangladesh’s 2005 
National Drug Policy) prevents companies from importing any medicine if that drug or a substitute is 
manufactured in Bangladesh. The 2005 National Drug Policy allows the government to intervene in 
the market to set the maximum sales price for any particular drug and prohibits many forms of 
advertising for pharmaceutical products. Finally, the Policy requires companies to adhere to the WHO 
guidelines on drug manufacturing and quality control.  
 
The 1982 Drugs Ordinance drove GSK to establish a manufacturing plant in Bangladesh; however, 
HQ does not allow GSKB to manufacture all medicines in Bangladesh that GSKB would like to. A 
special unit called the ‘developing-country market-access unit’ at HQ governs all of GSK’s 
pharmaceutical subsidiaries in emerging markets; moreover, the regional HQ in India (RHQ) largely 
decides relevant subsidiaries’ strategies. Evidence suggests that ownership and control structures that 
condition GSK to prioritize financial objectives influence the firm’s response. For instance, from a 
regional perspective, India has a larger market and provides economies of scale and production 
competitiveness (GSK122); consequently, to avoid duplication of costs RHQ does not allow GSKB to 





Whilst GSKB internalizes marketing and some production, it outsources distribution and logistics 
services from Zuelling Pharma, a Hong Kong-based pharmaceutical and logistics multinationals. 
RHQ selected Zuelling because it is a logistics partner for the entire region. Similarly, HQ and the 
Regional Quality Control Department chose the raw material supplier to ensure quality. By contrast, 
GSKB selected its production outsourcing partner, Beximco Pharma (GSK124). 
 
As various competitors started manufacturing insulin in Bangladesh, NNPP decided to manufacture 
insulin locally by establishing a licensing contract with SK+F. NNPP oversees quality control and 
standards as well as the supply of raw materials, while SK+F manages other aspects of production. 
Transcom Corporation, which was NNPP’s import agent and is now one of NNPP’s two distribution 
partners in Bangladesh, sells to pharmacies around the country. SK+F is a sister concern of Transcom. 
Bangladesh Institute for Research in Diabetes, Endocrinology and Metabolism (BIRDEM), is NNPP’s 
other distribution partner, selling and distributing NNPP products to all diabetes clinics run by the 
Diabetes Association of Bangladesh (BADAS). BIRDEM is a sister organization of BADAS. 
 
Both NNPP and GSKB work with local organizations in the areas of production and distribution to be 
able to produce and sell some pharmaceutical products. However, in terms of production and 
distribution some of these relationships do not require extensive collaboration. As we show in the next 
sub-section, the MNEs have links to other organizations; whilst NNPP’s response to the institutional 
void entails working closely with those other organizations in a partnership approach, GSKB’s 
response does not rely on such close or open-ended collaboration. 
 
Levels of cooperation from other local organizations  
To overcome the institutional void of a well-functioning healthcare system in Bangladesh (WHO, 
2015), Novo-Nordisk has identified the challenges and the opportunities in the market through 
partnering closely with some local organizations to develop a sustainable business model (Novo-
Nordisk, 2012) and institutions. In contrast, GSKB adopts a more diffuse strategy that requires only 
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relatively detached cooperation with local organizations that does not help as much to build 
institutions. 
 
Novo-Nordisk in Bangladesh 
Evidence from Novo-Nordisk clearly indicates the firm’s awareness of its need to work with local 
organizations that can help them to achieve their shared goals: ‘It is critical to identify and work with 
a local champion – someone who can maintain focus on the issues, consistently advocate for political 
will and help to secure economic resources. Changing diabetes in developing countries requires 
partnerships with public and private players who share our goal to improve healthcare delivery 
through sustainable business models’ (Novo-Nordisk, 2012: 5). 
 
NNPP identified BADAS, which is a non-profit organization that provides socio-medical services, as 
an important partner. The aim of BADAS is to ensure that ‘no diabetic patients should die untreated, 
unfed or unemployed even if she/he is poor' (BIRDEM, 2016). This matches with Novo-Nordisk 
Foundation’s vision: ‘welfare for the people’. That unified vision has helped both parties to focus on 
social outcomes through a mutually beneficial partnership. The President of BADAS has publicly 
noted that changing how diabetes is treated in Bangladesh: 
requires empowered patients and improved awareness, availability, affordability, accessibility 
and quality of care. […] In partnership with Novo-Nordisk we have managed to increase 
accessibility, awareness and affordability of quality diabetes care. Our partnership with 
Novo-Nordisk has been going on for years and is based on shared fundamental values (Novo-
Nordisk, 2012: 5, emphasis added). 
 
NNPP actively seeks to establish and develop this cooperation: 
we create shared value by maximising the upside and minimising the downside. ‘Maximising 
the upside’ includes increasing awareness about diabetes; improving accessibility, availability 
and affordability of diabetes care; and increasing quality of care. It also includes building 
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reputation, trust, employee engagement, stakeholder support and market potential for Novo-
Nordisk. (Novo-Nordisk, 2012: 21; emphasis added). 
 
It is important to note that the company, in the quotation above, refers to ‘market potential’, 
suggesting that immediate financial profits are not one of the firm’s aims. Novo-Nordisk’s ownership 
and control structure enable it to adopt such an approach. That is not to say, of course, that the 
company does not wish to make money at some point in the future, as the following quotation makes 
clear: 
  
The success of Novo Nordisk’s partnership with BADAS is rooted in shared fundamentals: 
focus, commitment, consistency and trust. […] BADAS has an ambitious goal to double the 
number of people it treats for diabetes. The societal value, in terms of health outcomes, is 
incalculable […]. To Novo Nordisk, the value can be expressed as sales potential: helping 
BADAS reach its treatment goal could more than double Novo Nordisk’s sales volume 
(Novo-Nordisk, 2012: 6, emphasis added). 
 
Tellingly, NNPP’s head of marketing noted that ‘Novo’s plan for market development with BADAS 
is a long-term commitment and initiative; it’s no longer limited to a time frame or project frame. Since 
diabetes is an unending disease in society, we need to continue to work on it in our society’ (NN171; 
emphasis added). Underlining the importance of NNPP links to BADAS, the marketing manager 
noted: ‘We consider BADAS as a guide to the diabetes industry; several projects proposed by 
BADAS and CDiC [Changing Diabetes in Children] are under our consideration, which we think are 
very timely and contributing to diabetes sector and the greater society of Bangladesh’ (NN171).  
 
To achieve its social and commercial goals, Novo-Nordisk has several institution-building projects in 
Bangladesh; two are particularly important. The first is a free clinic for diabetes-affected children and 
the second educates doctors about diabetes. NNPP runs the first of these projects, CDiC, in 
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collaboration with, amongst others, BADAS and BIRDEM. The clinics aim to help children who 
cannot afford to buy treatment and medicine. 
 
The project coordinator of CDiC at BIRDEM and who is not an NNPP employee said that ‘we started 
with only 100 children, and now there are 1200 children enrolled in this clinic. We provide free 
insulin and medical services as well as education to the patients.’ (BB121) When asked why Novo-
Nordisk was involved in the program, the interviewee, highlighting the company’s institutionally 
conditioned objectives, replied ‘Novo-Nordisk is doing this [providing social value] because they 
have a goal and commitment for the diabetes-affected patients in the developing countries, not only 
making profit from business.’ (BB121; emphasis added.)  
 
The same interviewee also stated that:  
Since the beginning, Novo has been committed to adult diabetes patients and collaborating 
with BADAS and WDF in order to create an infrastructure that can control and improve 
diabetes condition in Bangladesh. However, children’s diabetes is out of focus of the 
[government’s] policy, because of its small size. (BB121) 
 
This quotation highlights how Novo works with BADAS to achieve their shared objectives and 
promote the treatment of an otherwise neglected group. Further illustrating how closely BADAS and 
NNPP work together, the project coordinator noted that: 
I have proposed my idea to Novo that we need to develop a project on inclusive diabetes 
education for primary school [children] so that the entire children segment of the population 
are well aware of diabetes, and this can contribute to the management of diabetes in 
Bangladesh on sustainable basis. I believe that Novo will feel this need and will fund me’. 
(BB121) 
 
NNPP’s second major initiative is its low-cost distance learning program (DLP) for doctors that it 
runs in association with BADAS and the UK’s Open University. The DLP aims to increase doctors’ 
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knowledge of diabetes, to improve the quality of the care that diabetic patients receive in Bangladesh 
and, hence, reduce the country’s institutional void in this area. NNPP provided financial support for 
the DLP so that doctors could take the course for free. The program now has a strong reputation and 
doctors are willing to pay for it (Novo-Nordisk, 2012: 10), making the program more sustainable and 
demonstrating the value of NNPP’s close cooperation with other organizations. 
 
The DLP helps Novo-Nordisk to achieve its ‘welfare for the people’ objective, as the following 
quotation illustrates.  
[…] we believe that our involvement in professional education activities strengthens Novo 
Nordisk’s reputation and stakeholder support in the market. Our partnership with BADAS has 
generated significant value for both parties. (Novo-Nordisk, 2012: 11) 
 
NNPP adopts a partnership approach to its work with BADAS and, indeed, implements some of the 
ideas that they propose. For instance, when asked about Novo Nordisk’s contribution to Bangladesh, 
the President of BADAS said: 
 
‘the DLP and the CDiC clinic are the best contributions by Novo. [The] DLP emerged as a 
necessity in diabetes education in our medical education; I proposed the idea to the head of 
Novo Nordisk’s global stakeholders group, whom I know. He supported my proposal and it 
was proposed to Novo Nordisk’s stakeholders’ meeting in Copenhagen. […] Now it is the 
only certified diabetes education in Bangladesh for doctors that has been remarkably 
recognized in medical industry with good reputation’ (BB171; emphasis added). 
 
This quotation demonstrates how NNPP collaborates closely with local partners. It also highlights the 
scope and depth of the relationship between the two organizations as the BADAS President knows the 
head of Novo’s global stakeholder group. The importance of these personal links is also shown by 
Novo-Nordisk being able to build on them in another country: ‘Interestingly, BADAS has been a 
pioneer in combating diabetes; as a result BADAS president has been invited to advise the Indian 
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Diabetes Association to develop a similar distance learning program for doctors in Assam [an Indian 
state], which will be funded by Indian Novo Nordisk’ (NN171). 
 
Glaxo-Smith Kline in Bangladesh 
GSK’s focus on financial outcomes led its HQ to decide that work with local civil-society 
organizations should come under its CSR activities and, consequently, HQ should coordinate them, 
meaning that GSKB largely has arm’s length relationships to local organizations. As we will also 
show, GSKB’s response to the institutional void in Bangladesh’s healthcare reflect contextual factors, 
too.  
 
Many of GSKB’s relationships to local organizations come under the firm’s CSR activities: HQ has a 
policy for GSKB to spend 20 per cent of its profits on local development (GSKB, 2017). This money 
often funds projects that lead, at best, to detached cooperation between GSKB and local organizations. 
In many instances, local partners are not even aware of GSKB’s involvement in key projects, 
indicating how removed GSKB is from the day-to-day operations of the projects it helps to fund. This 
stems, in part, by the decision of HQ to select GSKB’s partners in Bangladesh based on HQ’s 
assessment of how the firm can best spend its money to achieve its objectives, which can minimize 
the role of GSKB and limit GSKB’s ability to respond appropriately to local requirements and 
requests from partner organizations. 
 
In an interview, the Director of the Health Unit at CARE-Bangladesh who looks after the GSK-CARE 
project in Sunamganj, which aims to improve maternal and children’s health by training ‘skilled birth 
attendants’ and ‘community health workers’ (Friendship, 2012; GSKB, 2014, 2017), provided 
detailed information on the project. GSK HQ decided that CARE would be the partner to help 
implement the project in Asia, resulting in CARE-UK signing an agreement with GSK-HQ to develop 
health-care infrastructure across several Asian countries, including Bangladesh (NGO174). This limits 
GSKB’s involvement in the project and how closely it works with local civil-society actors. The 
following quotation illustrates this lack of closeness between GSK and CARE: ‘I would say CARE 
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neither directly nor indirectly promotes GSK among the local and international communities; we 
would never do that, because we are not surviving on GSK’s money and we have our own values and 
thus we never promote GSK to the stakeholders. […] Once GSK’s health care division wanted to use 
our logo and program in their advertisement, but I refused humbly.’ (NGO174)  
 
Other evidence reveals how host-country organizations do not work closely with GSKB on related 
projects. GSKB’s M-Health project in collaboration with  Friendship-NGO aims to create a healthcare 
system in the Gaibanda district where many people do not have any access to healthcare facilities 
(GSKB, 2014). Some people who are associated with the project, including a senior district civil 
surgeon (Head of health), a legal support officer and a health worker on the project know neither 
about GSKB nor GSKB’s participation in the project; they only know Friendship-NGO (Min171, 
NGO173, and LO17). As the district’s Chief Health Administrator said ‘If they [GSKB] have any 
involvement in the Friendship social development project, they should communicate with us and 
share knowledge, so that the project can be more sustainable and effective for the community’ 
(Min17). In addition, the M-health service worker in Gaibanda indicated that she did ‘not know 
whether GSKB is involved with Friendship-NGO in delivering M-health project and what GSKB 
aims to achieve’ (NN173), she only knows the Friendship NGO. 
 
This appears to stem from GSKB’s loose collaboration with implementing partners and stakeholders 
and its short-term project-oriented attitude towards activities with local organizations that are not 
directly related to the manufacture, distribution and sale of medicines or, more importantly, consumer 
healthcare products (Med17, NGO173). GSKB’s involvement in Friendship’s M-health project 
demonstrates how GSKB’s response to the institutional void has been to provide better training and 
improve Bangladesh’s healthcare system, but in a very detached way. This reflects and reinforces 





We have demonstrated how differences between home-country institutions lead to fundamental firm 
variation and, hence, contribute to variation in firms’ responses to the same institutional void. We 
have also revealed how host-country institutions influence firms’ strategic behavior. Similarly and 
consistent with the critical-realist emphasis on studying the particularities of organizations (Bhaskar, 
2014), our research has shown that firm-specific host-country contexts will influence how foreign 
firms respond to institutional voids. As a result, the same institutional void does not trigger the same 
response in different firms. We have, therefore, complemented the existing literature that focuses 
more on the responses that firms, in general, have to specific institutional voids and that tends to 
downplay firms’ fundamental variation and the role of host-country institutions and contexts. 
 
For instance, Novo-Nordisk’s ownership and control characteristics meant that it had the potential to 
adopt a partnership approach with local organizations. The firm’s context promoted the actualization 
of that causal mechanism: Bangladesh is, and will be, an important market for diabetes drugs, Novo-
Nordisk’s main product. The company is, therefore, likely to take a long-term approach and work 
with local organizations to enhance its position there. By working with local organizations – by, for 
instance, helping to create an educational program that has since become self-sustaining – NNPP has 
been able to reduce (but not eliminate) the institutional void in Bangladesh’s healthcare system and 
has helped to improve access to diabetes care. The host-country law, the institution, that limits the 
import of drugs to those that are not manufactured in Bangladesh reinforced Novo-Nordisk’s 
commitment to the country: it decided to produce its main product, insulin, in the country. 
 
By contrast, GSK’s ownership and control characteristics meant that its potential to partner with local 
organizations to build institutions is much less. Its context meant that it was more likely to adopt an 
arm’s length approach to local organizations: the Bangladesh market for GSK is less than that of 
India, and the relative ease with which it could sell healthcare products, which do not require 
extensive cooperation with local organizations, compared to drugs, meant that it was likely to have a 
relatively low commitment to local organizations. GSKB has focused on selling general consumer 
healthcare products rather than medicines and has, therefore, largely avoided the specific institutional 
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voids in the healthcare system that decrease the sale of drugs via doctors and hospitals. Similarly, 
while GSKB produced some drugs in Bangladesh in order to 1) comply with the host-country 
institution that restricts the import of drugs to those not produced in the country and 2) sell those 
drugs, it chose to manufacture only a limited number of its drugs. This reflects both the relative 
importance of the Indian market compared to Bangladesh’s and the need to keep operating costs down 
to maintain or boost GSK’s financial performance.  
 
Drawing on these findings we make the following propositions: 
1. Home-country institutions that govern the ownership and control of companies will influence 
how firms respond to any specific institutional void. 
2. Foreign firms’ responses to institutional voids are not just conditioned by the nature of the 
institutional void itself, but also by relevant firm-specific host-country institutions and 
context. 
3. Home-country institutions and firm-specific host-country context will influence the 
mechanisms that MNEs have to respond to local organizations’ needs and, hence, shape how 
MNEs respond to any specific institutional void.  
 
Figure 3 about here 
 
Building on three propositions, we have developed Figure 3 that illustrates various types of MNE 
responses to institutional void, which are conditioned by the degree to which factors from three 
dimensions influence, for example, (1) home-country institutions (2) host-country context (i.e. 
horizontal axis) and (3) the nature of local partnership (i.e. vertical angel). While firms can 
avoid institutional void related to a particular market it could also change its focus on another 
market. MNEs can adapt to a market, or create a market, more importantly, at the deep level build 
infrastructure and institutions related to a specific market (Regnér & Edman, 2014), aiming to develop 




Our research has demonstrated the value of adopting an abductive case-study approach that builds on 
a critical realist perspective, highlighting how important causes of firms’ activities and decisions are 
not readily ‘observable’ (Geary & Aguzzoli, 2016). For instance, the influence of home-country 
ownership and control institutions emerges primarily from an examination of company documents 
and an analysis of key decisions rather than from extensive interview quotations that directly address 
the causal mechanisms behind specific decisions that our focal firms take, reflecting interviewees’ 
lack of detailed knowledge about how the two firms are owned and controlled. Future research could 
extend our contribution by examining other firms and sectors as well as how much variation there is 
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Figure 2: Data Coding Structure and Process 
1st Order Construct      2nd Order Theme       Aggregate Dimension 
 
 








C1: Societal welfare particularly related to diabetes and health 
C2: Improving quality of human life through research/innovation 
that affects business success and benefit consumer, society, 
employees and share holders 
C1: Developing shared goal for creating long-term sustainable 
health system and business growth. 
Aiming to build reputation, trust, employee engagement, 
stakeholder support and thus focusing on long-term commitment, 
consistency and building diabetics care system.  
C2: Aiming to focus on rising business units (health care products) 
while also harnessing the existing vaccine market by filling in health 
system void in rural areas s 
C1: Developing shared fundamental values through partnership with 
local actors 
C2: In collaboration, for CSR and supply, it looks for resource 
compatibility and shared goals instead of creating shared value   
Degree to which 















C1: - CDIC coordinator who frequently meets NNPP has proposed to 
NOVO to fund a project on inclusive diabetics education on primary 
school aiming to aware of diabetics to future generation and 
managing diabetics in Bangladesh on sustainable basis. 
- BADAS president participated in NPP's global stakeholders meeting 
in Copenhagen proposed the idea to develop certified diabetics 
education in Bangladesh for doctors. 
C2: - GSK's healthcare division wanted to use CARE's logo in their 
promotional document but CARE refused humbly. 
-  GSK never communicates with district health administrator rather 
limits communications with NGOs (FRIENDSHIP and CARE) and 
delegates entire project responsibility to NGOs who communicates 
with local institutions  
C1: - BADAS is the leading institution in Bangladesh having largest and 
the widest network of diabetes clinics in Bangladesh, participating in 
diabetics related policy formulation with government, which is NNPPs 
key strategic partner in Bangladesh.   
- SK+F is the leading pharmaceutical company whose parent 
organization (Transcom) is the largest distribution company in 
Bangladesh which is a key strategic partner for distribution and 
insulin packaging.  
C2: -GSK has strategic relation (for contract manufacturing) with 
leading pharmaceutical company Beximco who also works for other 
MNEs 
- GSKs strategic partner FRIENDSHIP and CARE (for CSR and rural 
healthcare development) who have their own agenda in which GSKB's 
project contributes  
C1: - NNPP develops strategic partnership for local manufacturing, 
creating diabetics support system and distribution (with local 
reputed company), develops diabetics support system with non-
profit foundation. 
- NNPP headquarters structure comprises non-profit foundation and 
profit company and headquarter delegates autonomy to subsidiary 
for local linkage development 
C2: Headquarter (emerging market unit of GSK) selects partners for 
distribution, CSR work and health care development 
- For health care development in Sunamgonj  HQ decided that CARE 
would be the partner to help implement the program in Asia 
including Bangladesh to help  















C1: -In partnership with BADAS we have managed to increase 
accessibility, awareness and affordability of quality diabetes care. 
- In collaboration with BADAS and WDF, we have created an 
infrastructure that can control and improve future diabetic condition 
in Bangladesh and the result is CDiC clinic for children.  
-We manage to distribute insulin through widely dispersed clinic 
network of BADAS and Transcom. 
- With help from CDiC new clinics are being setup in rural areas.  
C2:  GSK has its own manufacturing plant for around 50 years with 
limited capacity to manufacture limited medicine. 
-  Our partnership with care trains midwives and health workers who 
aims to fill up healthcare void in rural areas that would create future 
market for vaccines.  
C1: - CDiC and other clinic network of BADAS provide diabetes 
awareness and management information to children and adult 
patients. 
- Our DLP with BADAS and WDF that provides certified diabetics 
education to doctors in Bangladesh is the leading knowledge 
provider in medical industry.  
- Our hospital at Faridpur educates a large number of nurses and 
social workers in order for them to raise awareness about diabetes 
and treat patients.  
C2: -In M-health project with friendship health workers do not know 
GSK neither do they know why GSK funds for M-health project that 
creates health awareness and health service.  
- Recently GSK's partnership with CARE provides health awareness 
and health service in Faridpur district where health workers are 
trained by CARE do not know GSK and its mission.  Awareness and 
knowledge dissemination is therefore limited to operational NGO's 
goal. 








C1: -Partnership also creates reputation, trust, employee 
engagement, stakeholders support and market potential for NNPP. 
- Local manufacturing and DLP provides long-term effect on sales and 
brand image development for NNPP. 
C2: -From a regional perspective India has a larger market and 
provides economics of scale production competitiveness but GSKB is 
not legally allowed to import in Bangladesh 
-GSK thus focuses on growing healthcare product market instead of 
pharmaceuticals.  
C1: - Partnership between BADAS and NNPP leads to value creation 
that reaches the treatment goal of BADAS which expected to double 
NNPPS's sales volume. 
- Reputation of NNPP in diabetes helps sales personnel to promote 
product to doctor and gives prestige to employees to work at NNPP. 
  C2: - Bangladesh drug regulations impedes GSKB to expand its 
pharmaceutical market because GSKB is not allowed to manufacture 
many research products in Bangladesh 
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Figure 3: Institutions and local partnerships that affect MNE responses to Institutional Void 
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